In the mid-1960s, my grandfather earned his Doctorate in Philosophy with a thesis that I have since read. I thought it would be interesting to republish the abstract, and the bibliography he used to write it. I am not a student of philosophy by any stretch of the imagination, and I always admired him for being able to wrap his head around these concepts.
WILLIAM GIPSY TOLAND. The Later Wittgenstein and Classical Pragmatism: A Critical Appraisal. (Under the direction of ELIE MAYNARD ADAMS.)
This essay is a critical inquiry into the Later Wittgenstein and Classical Pragmatism with respect to Aim and Method, Theory of Meaning, and Philosophy of Language. Some contemporary philosophers find evidences of pragmatism in the later Wittgenstein’s major work, the Philosophical Investigations, particularly in the areas of meaning and language. This dissertation attempts to show the sense in which such findings are justified.
It is shown that the statements of the aim of Pragmatism are inconsistent and, if realized, would make of philosophy a handmaiden to the sciences. The pragmatic method is a kind of analysis by which the meanings of ideas and beliefs are explicated so that traditional metaphysical problems may be solved or resolved, and so that persons may more effectively make their way about in indeterminate life situations.
An appraisal of the pragmatic theory of meaning reveals that the meaning of ideas, beliefs, concepts, and linguistic expressions is always a function of their use in our language. This is shown to involve the view that the meaning of expression is the experience one has in saying or hearing it.
The aim of the later Wittgenstein is to show the philosopher how to order his knowledge of the uses of our ordinary language so that he may be relieved of endemic philosophical perplexities, confusion, anxieties, and puzzlement. The method by which he attempts to accomplish this aim is categorical analysis. This involves a description of the uses of significant concepts in ordinary language so that be seeing their roles in different regions of language the philosopher will realize that forcing them into other roles constitutes the source of traditional philosophical problems.
Typical of these problems is the “What is the meaning?” question, which suggests that there is one meaning of a word that can be had provided the proper method of analysis is applied. Wittgenstein shows, on the other hand, that in a large number of cases in which the meaning of a word is in question its meaning is its use in our language. Among many uses of ‘use’ Wittgenstein places considerable emphasis on the ‘effective’ or pragmatic use, but it is not enough to justify the view that he has a
pragmatic theory of meaning. The meaning of a word in the latter theory is its use to guide behavior in problematic situations and ordinary forms of life, but for Wittgenstein each word has its own logic or use.
Among the differences between Wittgenstein’s view of language and that of the Pragmatists, the following points are central. Peirce felt that philosophy needs a language peculiar to itself, but Wittgenstein’s view is that philosophy can be done within ordinary language. Dewey views language as a broader phenomenon that does Wittgenstein, more akin to the latter’s “language-game.” For Dewey all language is instrumental, whereas Wittgenstein holds that the logic of some sentences does not include an instrumental function. In the Investigations the function of language is not always to convey thought, but for Dewey communication is the factor that determines language as such. The Pragmatists attempt to outline a theory of language, but Wittgenstein does not attempt to advance any kind of theory.
Despite these dissimilarities Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning “language-game” closely resembles Dewey’s discussion points concerning language. Throughout his investigations there are remarks that warrant ascription of a prope-pragmatism to the later Wittgenstein, and there is evidence to justify the view that his work contains a pragmatic philosophy of language.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Adams, Elie Maynard (ed.). Categorial Analysis: Selected Essays of Everett W. Hall. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
Alston, William P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.
Austin, John Langshaw. How To Do Things With Words. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Carnap, Rudolf. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947.
Charlesworth, Maxwell John. Philosophy and Linguistics Analysis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1959.
Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic. 2d ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.
Cornman, James W. Metaphysics, Reference, and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Dewey, John. Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916.
Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958.
Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1938.
Dixon, Robert Malcom Ward. What Is Language? London: Longmans, Green and Company, Ltd., 1965.
Feibleman, James Kern. Inside the Great Mirror. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.
Gellner, Ernest. Words and Things. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959.
Haas, William Paul, O. P. The Conception of Law and The Unity of Peirce’s Philosophy. Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1964.
Hall, Everett Wesley. Philosophical Systems. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Hawkins, Denis John Bernard. Crucial Problems of Modern Philosophy. New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1957.
James, William. Collected Essays and Reviews. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1920.
__________. Pragmatism. New York: Meridian Books, 1955.
__________. Principles of Psychology. 2 vols. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892.
Katz, Jerrold J. The Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. Mind and the World Order. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956.
Mesthene, Emmanuel G. How Language Makes Us Know. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Passmore, John Arthur. A Hundred Years of Philosophy. London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, Ltd., 1958.
Paul, G. A., et al. The Revolution in Philosophy. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1957.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. 8 vols. Edited by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-58.
__________. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Edited by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955.
Pitcher, George Willard. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
Pole, David. The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London: The Athlone Press, 1958.
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. The Foundations of Mathematics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1931.
Russell, Bertrand. Philosophy. New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1927.
Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott. Logic for Use. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930.
__________. Studies in Humanism. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., n.d.
Waismann, Friedrich. The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1965.
White, Morton Gabriel. The Age of Analysis. New York: The New American Library of Literature, Inc., 1955.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. 2d ed. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1958.
__________. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.
__________. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1922.
Articles and Periodicals
Alston, William Payne. “Meaning and Use,” Philosophical Quarterly, XIII (April, 1963), 107-124.
Balz, Albert G. A., and Dewey, John. “A Letter to Mr. Dewey Concering John Dewey’s Doctrine of Possibility, Published Together With His Reply,” The Journal of Philosophy, XLVI (May, 1949), 313-42.
Chomsky, Noam. “Current Issues in Linguistic Theory,” The Structure of Language. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
Cowan, Joseph Lloyd. “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Logic,” The Philosophical Review, LXX (July, 1961), 362-75.
Evans, J. L. “On Meaning and Verification,” Mind, LXII (January, 1953), 1-19.
Feyerabend, Paul. “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,” The Philosophical Review, LXIV (July, 1955), 449-83.
Haas, W. “On Speaking a Language,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., LI (1950-51), 129-66.
Heath, P. L. “Wittgenstein Investigated,” The Philosophical Quarterly, VI (January, 1956), 66-71.
Hook, Sidney. “Pragmatism and Existentialism,” Antioch Review, XIX (Summer, 1959), 151-68.
MacIver, A. M. “The Instrumentality of Language,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., LXII (1961-62), 1-20.
Malcolm, Norman. “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,” The Philosophical Review, LXIII (October, 1954), 530-59.
Moore, George Edward. “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33,” Mind, LXIII (January; July, 1954), 1-15, 289-316; LXIV (January, 1955), 1-27.
Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language,” The Philosophical Review, LXX (April, 1961), 197-223.
Ryle, Gilbert. “Ordinary Language,” The Philosophical Review, LXII (April, 1953), 167-86.
Stebbing, L. Susan. “Logical Positivism and Analysis,” Proceedings of the British Academy, XIX (1933), 53-87.
__________. “The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., XXXIII (1932-33), 65-94.
Waismann, Friedrich. “Verfiability,” Logic and Language, First and Second Series. Edited by Antony Flew. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965.
Wisdom, John. “Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1934-1937,” Mind, LXI (April, 1952), 258-60.
Unpublished Manuscript
Lanfear, Ray. “An Analysis and Evaluation of Wittgenstein’s Locution: Meaning as ‘Use.’” Unpublished Master’s thesis, Baylor University, 1964.
